

How powerful are integer-valued martingales?

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Abstract. In the theory of algorithmic randomness, one of the central notions is that of computable randomness. An infinite binary sequence X is computably random if no recursive martingale (strategy) can win an infinite amount of money by betting on the values of the bits of X . In the classical model, the martingales considered are real-valued, that is, the bets made by the martingale can be arbitrary real numbers. In this paper, we investigate a more restricted model, where only integer-valued martingales are considered, and we study the class of random sequences induced by this model.

1 Gambling with or without coins

One of the main approaches to define the notion of random sequence is the so-called “unpredictability paradigm”. We say that an infinite binary sequence is “random” if there is no effective way to win arbitrarily large amounts of money by betting on the values of its bits. The main notion arising from this paradigm is computable randomness, but other central notions such as Martin-Löf randomness, Schnorr randomness, and Kurtz randomness, can be formulated in this setting. For all of these notions, we consider models of games where the player can, at each turn, bet *any* amount of money between 0 and his current capital. In “practice” however, one cannot go into a casino and bet arbitrarily small sums of money: there is always a unit value, and any bet made has to be a multiple of this value. Some casinos (and games) also impose upper limits on the amount of capital the one can gamble in each round of play. In the following exposition, we examine the consequences of restricting betting amounts to integers and finite sets.

To formalize the unpredictability paradigm, we need the central notion of *martingale*. A martingale is a betting strategy for a fair game and is formally represented by a function that corresponds to the gambler’s fortune at each moment in time. Let $\{0,1\}^*$ denote the set of all finite binary sequences, and $\{0,1\}^\omega$ is the set of all countably infinite binary sequences (a.k.a *reals*). Any

function $M : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ which satisfies the *fairness condition*

$$M(\sigma) = \frac{M(\sigma 0) + M(\sigma 1)}{2} \quad (1.1)$$

for all $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}^*$ is called a *martingale*. $M(\sigma)$ corresponds to the gambler's capital after having already bet on the finite sequence σ . The fairness condition (1.1) says that the amount of money gained from an outcome of "0" is the same that would be lost from an outcome of "1". It is important to note that our definition of martingale is a very restricted version of what is usually referred to as "martingale" in probability theory, where it is defined to be a sequence X_0, X_1, \dots of real-valued random variables (possibly taking negative values) such that for all n

$$\mathbb{E}[X_{n+1} | X_0, X_1, \dots, X_n] = X_n$$

To make the distinction, we call such a sequence a *martingale process*. A martingale is called *recursive* if M is a recursive function. Throughout this exposition, "martingale" and "recursive martingale" will be used synonymously.


For any $A \in \{0, 1\}^\omega$, $A \upharpoonright n$ is the finite binary sequence, or *initial segment*, consisting of the first n digits of A . We also identify sets with their characteristic sequences. A martingale M *succeeds* on $A \in \{0, 1\}^\omega$ if M achieves arbitrary sums of money over A , that is, $\limsup_n M(A \upharpoonright n) = \infty$. Otherwise A *defeats* M . M *Schnorr-succeeds* on a set A if M succeeds on A and there exists a recursive, non-decreasing, unbounded function f such that $f(n) < M(A \upharpoonright n)$ for infinitely many n . M *Kurtz-succeeds* on a set A if M succeeds on A and there exists a recursive, non-decreasing, unbounded function f such that $f(n) < M(A \upharpoonright n)$ for all n . We can now define the main classical notions of randomness in terms of martingales.

Definition 1. A sequence $A \in \{0, 1\}^\omega$ is called *computably random* if A defeats every martingale. If no martingale Schnorr-succeeds on A , then A is *Schnorr random*. If no martingale Kurtz-succeeds on A , then A is *Kurtz random* (equivalently, A is Kurtz random if and only if A does not belong to any Π_1^0 subset of $\{0, 1\}^\omega$ of measure 0).

In this paper, we shall consider games where the player can only make bets of integer value. For M a martingale and $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}^*$, $|M(\sigma 0) - M(\sigma)|$ is called the *wager at σ* . Now, given a set V of non-negative integers, we say that a martingale is *V-valued* if for all σ the wager of M at σ belongs to V , unless M does not have enough capital in which case the wager at σ is 0. Formally, M is *V-valued* if for all $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $a \in \{0, 1\}$, $M(\sigma) < \min(V) \Rightarrow M(\sigma a) = M(\sigma)$ and $M(\sigma) \geq \min(V) \Rightarrow |M(\sigma a) - M(\sigma)| \in V$. We call any such martingale *integer-valued*. In case V is finite we say that M is *finitely-valued* and if V is a singleton, that M is *single-valued*.

Definition 2. A real α is *V-valued random* if no *V-valued* martingale succeeds on α . A real α is a *finitely-valued / integer-valued / single-valued random* if no finitely-valued / integer-valued / single-valued martingale succeeds on α .

The rest of the paper studies how these new notions of randomness interact with the classical ones. We will prove the implications of the following diagram:



and we shall further see that no other implication than those indicated (and their transitive closure) holds.

If we were to ask someone what the absolute minimum one could expect from a set called “random,” you might receive one of the following two responses:

1. The set obeys the law of large numbers.
2. The set is bi-immune.

The person who says “1” believes that a set which does not follow the law of large numbers exhibits a probabilistic bias in its distribution of 0’s and 1’s. The person who says “2” believes that a set with an infinite recursive subset of 0’s or 1’s yields algorithmic bias. There exists, however, a third possibility:

3. The set is single-valued random.

“3” closely matches our intuition in the sense that one should not be able to predict successive outcomes resulting from a “random” process. From a practical point-of-view, single-valued randomness also makes sense. If you have to sit out 2^{1000} rounds of roulette before placing a sure bet, as might occur when gambling on a non-bi-immune set, then with probability 1 the casino has already closed while you were waiting for this opportunity. In Section 3, we shall prove that notion “3” indeed differs from notions “1” and “2.”

The separation of Kurtz randomness and Schnorr randomness is folklore (we will see in a moment how it can be proven). A somewhat more difficult result is the separation of computable randomness and Schnorr randomness. The separation of these two notions was proven by Wang who constructed a Schnorr random sequence X together with a martingale d that succeeds on X . It turns out that in Wang’s construction, the martingale d is already $\{0, 1\}$ -valued, hence it immediately follows that Schnorr randomness (a fortiori Kurtz randomness) does not imply finitely-valued randomness (and a fortiori integer-valued randomness).

Theorem 3 (Wang [16]). *There exists a Schnorr random $X \in \{0, 1\}^\omega$ and an $\{0, 1\}$ -valued martingale d such that d succeeds on X .*

In Section 2 we shall see that conversely, integer-valued randomness does not imply Schnorr randomness, and a fortiori computable randomness.

2 Integer-valued martingales and genericity

There is an essential difference between rational-valued and integer-valued martingales. The latter can always be permanently defeated while in general the former cannot be. Consider the example of a player starting with an initial capital of 1 who at each turn bets half of its capital on the value 1 (that is, the corresponding martingale d satisfies $d(\sigma 0) = d(\sigma)/2$ and $d(\sigma 1) = 3d(\sigma)/2$ for all $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}^*$). This is a rational-valued martingale with the following property. Pick a stage s of the game; no matter how unlucky the player has been before that stage, she always has a chance to recover. More precisely, for any finite sequence of outcomes $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}^*$, no matter how small $d(\sigma)$ is, the player can still win the game if the remaining of the outcomes contains a lot of 0's (for example the player wins against the sequence $\sigma 0000\dots$). This phenomenon no longer holds for integer-valued martingales, and in fact the opposite is true, that is, no matter how lucky the player has been up to stage s , there is always a risk for her to see her strategy permanently defeated at some stage $s' > s$. This is expressed by the following lemma.

Lemma 4. *Let d be an integer-valued martingale. For any $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}^*$, there exists an extension $\tau(\sigma, d) \in \{0, 1\}^*$ of σ such that $d(\tau') = d(\tau(\sigma, d))$ for all extensions τ' of $\tau(\sigma, d)$ (in particular the strategy d does not succeed on any $X \in \{0, 1\}^\omega$ extending $\tau(\sigma, d)$).*

From a topological perspective, the above result shows that any integer-valued martingale d is defeated on a dense open set. Indeed, for any σ , d is defeated by every sequence $X \in [\tau(\sigma, d)]$ hence d is defeated by any sequence in the dense open set

$$\mathcal{U}_d = \bigcup_{\sigma \in \{0, 1\}^*} [\tau(\sigma, d)]$$

(it is dense as for any σ , $[\tau(\sigma, d)] \subseteq [\sigma]$ by construction). Therefore, the set of integer-valued random sequences contains the intersection over all integer-valued martingales $\bigcap \mathcal{U}_d$. This is a countable intersection of dense open sets, hence the following corollary.

Corollary 5. *The set of integer-valued random sequences is co-meager.*

This shows that as a notion of randomness, integer-valued randomness is quite weak. Indeed, the one of the most basic properties that we can expect from a random sequence X is that it satisfies the law of large numbers, that is, that the number of 0's in $X \upharpoonright n$ is $n/2 + o(n)$. It is a routine exercise to show that the set of sequences X satisfying the law of large numbers is a meager set (contained in a countable union of closed set with empty interior). Therefore, in the sense of Baire category, most sequences there are integer-valued random but do not satisfy the law of large numbers. On the other hand, it is well-known that any Schnorr random sequence must satisfy the law of large numbers, which yields a further corollary.

Corollary 6. *There exists a sequence $X \in \{0, 1\}^\omega$ which is integer-valued random but not Schnorr random.*

If we now want to compare integer-valued randomness and Kurtz randomness, the above results are insufficient, as the set of Kurtz random sequences is also a co-meager set. We will prove that Kurtz randomness does not imply integer-valued randomness by looking at the classical counterpart of Baire category, namely genericity. Recall that a set $W \subseteq \{0, 1\}^*$ is dense if the open set $\bigcup_{\sigma \in W} [\sigma]$ is dense or equivalently if for any string τ there exists $\sigma \in W$ extending τ . We say that $X \in \{0, 1\}^\omega$ is weakly n -generic if for any dense Σ_n^0 set of strings W , X has a prefix in W . We further say that X is 1-generic if for any Σ_n^0 set of strings W (not necessarily dense), either X has a prefix in W or there exists a prefix σ of X which has no extension in W . For all $n \geq 0$ it holds that

$$\text{weakly } (n+1)\text{-generic} \Rightarrow n\text{-generic} \Rightarrow \text{weakly } n\text{-generic}.$$

Kurtz showed that weakly 1-genericity is enough to ensure Kurtz randomness.

Proposition 7 (Kurtz [8]). *Any weakly 1-generic sequence $X \in \{0, 1\}^\omega$ is Kurtz random.*

The next two theorems show that more genericity is needed to ensure integer-valued randomness. That is, weak 2-genericity is sufficient, but 1-genericity is not.

Theorem 8. *Let $X \in \{0, 1\}^\omega$ be any weakly 2-generic sequence. Then X is integer-valued random.*

Proof. We have shown in Lemma 4 that for any martingale $d \in \mathfrak{D}$, the set of strings

$$W_d = \{\sigma : d(\sigma') = d(\sigma) \text{ for all extensions } \sigma' \text{ of } \sigma\}$$

is dense. It is also easy to see that this set is recursive in $\mathbf{0}'$, in particular W_d is Σ_2^0 . By definition, a weak-2-generic sequence X must have a prefix in W_d for all integer-valued martingales d , and it is clear that if X has a prefix in W_d , d does not succeed on X . \square

Theorem 9. *There exists a 1-generic sequence $X \in \{0, 1\}^\omega$ and a $\{0, 1\}$ -valued martingale d such that d succeeds on X .*

Corollary 10. *There exists a sequence $X \in \{0, 1\}^\omega$ which is Kurtz random but not integer-valued random.*

The converse of this result is also true, that is there exists a sequence X which is integer-valued random but not Kurtz random. To prove this, we will need a different approach, via measure-theoretic arguments, which we will outline in Section 4.

3 Finitely-valued martingales

We now consider the effects of imposing betting limits on martingale strategies. First we separate integer-valued randomness from finitely-valued randomness.

Theorem 11. *There exists an integer-valued martingale which succeeds on a finitely-valued random.*

Schnorr showed that for any set A , a real-valued martingale succeeds on A if and only if a rational-valued martingale succeeds on A (see [13], or [11] p.270). His proof, however, does not carry over to the finitely-valued case.

Open question 12. *If we allow finitely-valued martingales to bet real values instead of rationals, do we get the same class of finitely-valued randoms?*

3.1 On single-valued randoms

For the following discussion, it is useful to keep in mind that a real is single-valued random if and only if it is $\{1\}$ -valued random; the particular dollar amount which is bet each round is immaterial. For comparison with Kurtz randomness, we appeal directly to a theorem of Doob ([5] p.324). The following version for “non-negative” martingales appears in Ross’s book ([12], p.316).

Theorem 13 (Doob’s Martingale Convergence Theorem). *For every martingale M , the set of reals on which M succeeds has measure zero. Furthermore, the capital of M converges to some finite value with probability 1.*

Later, in Theorem 25, we shall use a more general version of Doob’s Martingale Convergence Theorem (see Billingsley [3] p.468):

Theorem 14. *Let X_0, X_1, \dots be a martingale process (where each X_i is a random variable). If for some $m \in \mathbb{R}$, we have $X_n \geq m$ for all n , then almost surely $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} X_n$ exists and is finite.*

Proposition 15. *Every Kurtz random is single-valued random.*

Proof. Suppose that some single-valued martingale M succeeds on a real X . Let F denote the set of reals on which M converges to some finite value. Then α does not belong to F , and F has measure one by Doob’s Martingale Convergence Theorem. Hence α belongs to the measure zero set \overline{F} .

By definition of single-valued, M is required to bet at every position of the input real. Hence the only way for M to converge to a finite value is to reach the value 0 and become constant. Therefore F is, in fact, the set of reals on which M eventually goes broke. Thus \overline{F} is the set of all infinite paths through the tree $\{\sigma : M(\sigma) > 0\}$. It follows that \overline{F} is a recursive Π_1^0 class. In summary, X belongs to a recursive Π_1^0 class of measure zero and therefore is not Kurtz random. \square

Remark. The above argument shows even more: every Kurtz random is V -valued random for any positive set of integers V .

We now separate the incomparable notions of bi-immunity, single-valued random and law of large numbers.

Theorem 16. *There exists a single-valued random which is neither immune nor co-immune.*

Theorem 17. *There exists a $\mathbf{0}'$ -recursive, bi-hyperimmune set which is not single-valued random.*

Proof. Let $\varphi_0, \varphi_1, \varphi_2, \dots$ be a list of the partial recursive functions. Define a $\mathbf{0}'$ -recursive function f satisfying

$$(\forall e < n) [\varphi_e(f(n)) \downarrow \implies f(n+1) > \varphi_e(f(n)) + 2]$$

and let

$$A = \{x : (\exists n) [f(2n) \leq x < f(2n+1)]\}.$$

Now $A = \{a_0, a_1, a_2, \dots\}$ is bi-hyperimmune because for any recursive φ_k ,

$$\varphi_k[f(2k+1)] < f(2k+2) - 2 \leq a_{f(2k+1)} - 1,$$

and a similar inequality holds for the complement of A . On the other hand, the single-valued martingale strategy which bets on $A(n+1)$ what the gambler saw at $A(n)$ will succeed on A . This strategy indeed succeeds because each time $A(n+1)$ disagrees with $A(n)$, we have that $A(n+2)$ and $A(n+3)$ agree with $A(n+1)$. So over each three consecutive rounds of betting, the gambler increases his capital by at least \$1. \square

Finally, we note that it is possible to separate single-valued randomness from finite-valued randomness using an argument along the lines of Theorem 16.

Proposition 18. *There exists a $\{1, 2\}$ -valued martingale which succeeds on a single-valued random.*

3.2 On $\{0, 1\}$ -valued randoms

We can also separate single-valued randomness from finite-valued randomness.

Proposition 19. *Let V be any set containing 0 and at least one other number n . Then any V -valued random is bi-immune.*

Proof. Let A be a set which is not bi-immune; without loss of generality assume that A contains an infinite recursive set B . Then a V -valued martingale strategy which bets n dollars on members of B and 0 on $A - B$ will succeed on A . \square

The following corollary is a consequence of the definition of finitely-valued random and Proposition 19.

Corollary 20. *finitely-valued random $\implies \{0, 1\}$ -valued random \implies bi-immune.*

Since single-valued random does not imply bi-immune (Theorem 16), we obtain from Corollary 20:

Corollary 21. *There exists a $\{0, 1\}$ -valued random which is not single-valued random.*

Although we were able to separate single-valued randomness from $\{1, 2\}$ -valued randomness (Proposition 18), the comparison between $\{0, 1\}$ -valued randoms and $\{0, 1, 2\}$ -valued randoms seems less clear. We leave the reader with the following interesting question.

Open question 22. *Is $\{0, 1\}$ -valued random the same as finitely-valued random?*

4 Integer-valued martingales and Bernoulli measures

In this last section, we present a proof of the fact that integer-valued randomness does not imply Kurtz randomness. We will get a counter example by choosing a sequence X at random with respect to some carefully-chosen probability measure.

Intuitively speaking, the Lebesgue measure λ on the space $\{0, 1\}^\omega$ corresponds to the random trial where all bits are obtained by independent tosses of a balanced 0/1-coin. An interesting generalization of Lebesgue measure is the class of *Bernoulli measures*, where for a given parameter $\delta \in [-1/2, 1/2]$ we construct a sequence X by independent tosses of a coin with bias δ (that is, the coin gives 1 with probability $1/2 + \delta$ and 0 with probability $1/2 - \delta$). This can be further generalized by considering an infinite sequence of independent coin tosses where the n^{th} coin tossed has bias δ_n . This leads to the notion of *generalized Bernoulli measures*. Formally, on the space $\{0, 1\}^\omega$, given a sequence $(\delta_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ of numbers in $[-1/2, 1/2]$, we call *generalized Bernoulli measure* of parameter $(\delta_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ is the unique measure μ such that for all $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}^*$:

$$\mu([\sigma]) = \prod_{n : \sigma(n)=0} (1 - p_n) \prod_{n : \sigma(n)=1} p_n.$$

One can expect that if the δ_n are very small (that is, δ_n tends to 0 quickly), then the generalized Bernoulli measure of parameter $(\delta_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ will not differ much from Lebesgue measure. This was made precise by Kakutani.

Theorem 23 (Kakutani [7]). *Let μ be the generalized Bernoulli measure of parameter $(\delta_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$. If the condition*

$$\sum_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \delta_n^2 < \infty \tag{4.1}$$

holds, then μ is equivalent to Lebesgue measure λ , that is, for any subset \mathcal{X} of $\{0, 1\}^\omega$, $\mu(\mathcal{X}) = 0$ if and only if $\lambda(\mathcal{X}) = 0$. If condition (4.1) does not hold, then μ and λ are inconsistent, that is, there exists some \mathcal{Y} such that $\mu(\mathcal{Y}) = 0$ while $\lambda(\mathcal{Y}) = 1$.

If we want to work in a computability setting, we need to consider *computable* generalized Bernoulli measures, that is, those for which the parameter $(\delta_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a recursive sequence of reals. Vovk [15] showed a constructive analogue of Kakutani's theorem for computable generalized Bernoulli measures in relation with Martin-Löf randomness (perhaps the most famous effective notion of randomness, but we do not need it in this paper). The Kakutani-Vovk result has been used many times in the literature [2, 9, 10, 14]. In particular, Bienvenu and Merkle proved the following.

Theorem 24 (Bienvenu and Merkle [2]). *Let μ be a computable generalized Bernoulli measure of parameter $(\delta_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$. If $\sum_n \delta_n^2 = +\infty$, then the class of Kurtz random sequences has μ -measure 0.*

To prove that integer-valued randomness does not imply Kurtz randomness, we will construct a computable generalized Bernoulli measure μ whose parameter $(\delta_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ converges to 0 sufficiently slowly to have $\sum_n \delta_n^2 = +\infty$ (hence by the above μ -almost all sequences X are not Kurtz random, which we will make even more precise) but sufficiently quickly to make μ close to Lebesgue measure and ensure that μ -almost all sequences are integer-valued random.

Theorem 25. *There exists a sequence $X \in \{0, 1\}^\omega$ which is integer-valued random but not Kurtz random.*

Proof (Sketch). We obtain X by choosing a random sequence with respect to the generalized Bernoulli measure of parameter (δ_n) with

$$\delta_n = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n \ln n}}$$

By Theorem 24 we obtain almost surely a sequence X that is not Kurtz random. The difficulty is to show that X is almost surely integer-valued random. The argument goes as follows. When a bit has probability $1/2 + \delta_n$ to be 0, the player's best move (when there is no restriction on how much can be bet) is to bet a *fraction* $2\delta_n$ of her capital on the value 0 (e.g. if $\delta = 0.1$, the player should bet 20% of her capital). Using this strategy, the player can roughly expect to have $O(\sum_{i=0}^n \delta_i^2)$ after stage n . However, if the player plays too risky, i.e. bets at each turn a fraction ρ_n of her capital such that $\rho_n/\delta_n \rightarrow \infty$, then almost surely the player will lose the game.

With the value of the δ_n we have chosen, the optimal strategy will yield a gain of $O(\sum_{i=0}^n 1/(n \ln n))$, i.e. $O(\ln \ln n)$. But then, if the player is forced to make bets of integer value, even a bet of \$1 will represent a fraction ρ_n of her capital of at least $1/\ln \ln n$, which is much bigger than δ_n , hence the player would lose the game almost surely if making such bets. But the only alternative is to bet 0, which also causes the player to lose the game.

Open question 26. *Do there exist other characterizations for integer-valued, finite-valued, or single-valued randoms in terms of Kolmogorov complexity or Martin-Löf statistical tests?*

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Appendix

Proof of Lemma 4

Let d, σ be fixed. We construct the string $\tau = \tau(\sigma, d)$ via the algorithm:

1. Set $\tau \leftarrow \sigma$
2. While there exists an extension τ' of τ such that $d(\tau') < d(\tau)$
 Choose any such τ' and set $\tau \leftarrow \tau'$ (and go back to step 2.)
3. Return(τ)

Note that this is algorithm in a general sense, that is, we do not claim that it can be implemented in a computable way (and indeed it cannot be, because the condition of the “While” loop needs to check the values $d(\tau')$ for all extensions of τ and there are infinitely many of them), but only that it outputs a correct value of τ . First, to see that the algorithm terminates, notice that after each execution of the While loop, the value of $d(\tau)$ is decreased, and because d has integer values, this means that $d(\tau)$ is decreased by at least 1. Therefore the While loop is executed at most $k = d(\sigma)$ times. We also claim that the output τ is correct: indeed it must fail the condition of the While loop, that is, for all extensions τ' of τ one has $d(\tau') \geq d(\tau)$. But the fairness condition of martingales implies that in that case, $d(\tau') = d(\tau)$ for all extensions τ' of τ (this can be checked by a straightforward induction).

Proof of Theorem 9

We will build the sequence X by constructing an increasing (for the prefix order) sequence (γ_n) of strings, then taking X to be the unique element of $\{0, 1\}^\omega$ having all of the γ_n as prefixes.

Let $(W_e)_{e \in \mathbb{N}}$ be an effective enumeration of all Σ_1^0 sets of strings. For all e , set

$$F_e = \{\tau : \exists \sigma \in W_{e, |\tau|} \text{ and } \tau \text{ extends } \sigma\}$$

and F_e^{\min} the set of minimal elements of F_e , that is, the set of τ such that $\tau \in F_e$ and no strict prefix of τ is in F_e . Note that whenever a string σ is in F_e , then so are all strings that extend σ , and whenever a string σ is F_e^{\min} , then no strict extension of σ is. It is clear that the F_e and F_e^{\min} are (uniformly) recursive sets, and also easy to see that a sequence $Y \in \{0, 1\}^\omega$ is 1-generic if and only if for all e , either Y has a prefix in F_e (resp. F_e^{\min}) or some prefix of Y has no extension in F_e .

We start by defining the martingale d which will succeed on the sequence X . It is defined by $d(\epsilon) = 12$ and for all $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $a \in \{0, 1\}$:

$$d(\sigma a) = \begin{cases} d(\sigma) + 2 & \text{if } d(\sigma) \geq \text{permit}(\sigma) \text{ and } a = 1 \\ d(\sigma) - 2 & \text{if } d(\sigma) \geq \text{permit}(\sigma) \text{ and } a = 0 \\ d(\sigma) & \text{if } d(\sigma) < \text{permit}(\sigma) \end{cases}$$

where the function **permit** is defined inductively by $\mathbf{permit}(\epsilon) = 4$ and for any $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $a \in \{0, 1\}$, $\mathbf{permit}(\sigma a)$ is the minimum of $\mathbf{permit}(\sigma) + 1$ and all values $4e + 4$ such that $\sigma a \in F_e^{\min}$. It is also easy to see that **permit** and d are recursive, and d is integer-valued (its values are positive because $\mathbf{permit}(\sigma) \geq 4$ for all σ , hence d is never allowed to make a bet if its capital is less than 4).

We now define the sequence of strings (γ_n) , and an auxiliary sequence (ζ_n) by setting $\gamma_0 = \epsilon$, $\zeta_0 = \epsilon$ and inductively, for all n :

- (a) if there exists an extension of γ_n in F_n then let ζ_{n+1} be a shortest such extension (chosen effectively), and
- (b) if there exists no such extension, let $\zeta_{n+1} = \gamma_n$

Finally, define $\gamma_{n+1} = \zeta_{n+1}11111111$.

Note that ζ_n can be determined from γ_n using the oracle \mathbf{O}' , hence the sequence X obtained in this construction (by taking the limit of the γ_n , or equivalently the limit of the ζ_n) is also recursive in \mathbf{O}' . We now prove that X is as wanted by a series of claims.

- (i) X is 1-generic. Indeed, at stage n of the construction, either ζ_n is in F_n (in fact in F_n^{\min}) or no extension of ζ_n is in F_n .
- (ii) In both cases (a) and (b) of the construction, we ensure that no strict extension of ζ_n is in F_n^{\min} . Indeed either case (a) holds, and ζ_n is itself in F_n^{\min} in which case no strict extension of ζ_n is, or case (b) holds, in which case no extension of ζ_n is in F_n , and fortiori no extension is in F_n^{\min} . Additionally, for all n , ζ_n is a strict extension of all ζ_k for $k < n$, therefore we conclude by induction that for all n and all $k \leq n$, no strict extension of ζ_n is in F_k^{\min} .
- (iii) For all n , $\mathbf{permit}(\zeta_n) \geq 4n + 4$, and moreover, any string σ extending ζ_n by at least 4 bits satisfies $\mathbf{permit}(\sigma) \geq 4n + 8$. This is shown by induction. First, this holds for $n = 0$: all values of the function **permit** are greater or equal to 4, in particular, $\mathbf{permit}(\zeta_0) \geq 4$. Now suppose that $\mathbf{permit}(\zeta_n) \geq 4n + 4$ for some n . As we have seen in claim (ii) above, no strict extension of ζ_n is in F_k for any $k \leq n$. Thus, for any extension ζ' of ζ_n and $a \in \{0, 1\}$ we have by definition of **permit**: $\mathbf{permit}(\zeta' a) \geq \min(\mathbf{permit}(\zeta') + 1, 4n + 8)$. From this, we see by a straightforward induction that string σ extending ζ_n by 4 bits or more satisfies $\mathbf{permit}(\sigma) \geq 4n + 8$. In particular, ζ_{n+1} extends ζ_n by at least 8 bits, hence $\mathbf{permit}(\zeta_{n+1}) \geq 4n + 8$, which concludes the induction.
- (iv) Similarly, for all n , $\mathbf{permit}(\gamma_n) \geq 4n + 4$. This is true for $n = 0$, and for $n > 0$, since γ_n is an extension of ζ_{n-1} by 8 bits, it follows from (iii) that $\mathbf{permit}(\gamma_n) \geq 4(n - 1) + 8 = 4n + 4$.
- (v) For all n , $d(\gamma_n) \geq \mathbf{permit}(\gamma_n) + 8$. This is true for $n = 0$. For the induction step, we need to distinguish two cases depending on how γ_{n+1} was constructed from γ_n . If we are in the above case (a), then $\gamma_{n+1} = \gamma_n 11111111$,

and since $d(\gamma_n) > \text{permit}(\gamma_n)$, d bets and wins 8 consecutive times, and thus $d(\gamma_{n+1}) = d(\gamma_n) + 16$. Also, in that case $\text{permit}(\gamma_{n+1}) \leq \text{permit}(\gamma_n) + 8$ by definition of permit (adding one bit to a string can only increase the value of permit by 1). From these two facts we can conclude that $d(\gamma_{n+1}) \geq \text{permit}(\gamma_{n+1}) + 8$. Suppose now that γ_{n+1} was constructed according to case (b) above. In that case, we need to precisely analyze the behavior of d and permit between γ_n and ζ_n , i.e. on strings of type $\gamma_n\eta$ with $0 \leq |\eta| \leq |\zeta_n| - |\gamma_n|$. First, γ_n is an extension of ζ_{n-1} hence by (ii) no strings $\gamma_n\eta$ is in F_k^{\min} for $k < n$. Additionally, since ζ_n belongs to F_n^{\min} , no prefix of ζ_n does. This shows by definition of permit that for $|\eta| \leq 4$ one has $\text{permit}(\gamma_n\eta) = \text{permit}(\gamma_n) + |\eta|$ and for $|\eta| \geq 4$ one has $\text{permit}(\gamma_n\eta) \geq 4n + 8$. On the other hand, $d(\gamma_n) \geq \text{permit}(\gamma_n) + 8 \geq 4n + 12$ (by (iv)). Since d can only decrease by 2 at each move, we have $d(\gamma_n\eta) \geq 4n + 6$ for any $|\eta| \leq 3$. But if $|\eta| \geq 4$, as we just saw, the value of $\text{permit}(\gamma_n\eta)$ is at least $4n + 8$, and the martingale d is never allowed to bet if its capital is below permit . Hence, it follows that $d(\gamma_n\eta) \geq 4n + 6$ whenever $0 \leq |\eta| \leq |\zeta_n| - |\gamma_n|$. In particular, $d(\zeta_n) \geq 4n + 6$, and since we are in case (b), $\text{permit}(\zeta_n) = 4n + 4$, thus d is allowed to bet and wins 8 times consecutively, and $d(\gamma_{n+1}) \geq 4n + 22$. Finally, we have $\text{permit}(\gamma_{n+1}) \leq \text{permit}(\zeta_n) + 8 \leq 4n + 12$. This finishes the induction.

We have seen in (i) that X is 1-generic, and from (iv) and (v), it follows that $\limsup_n d(\gamma_n) = +\infty$, hence d succeeds on X .

Proof of Theorem 11

Partition the natural numbers into finite intervals, with 2^n intervals of length n followed by 2^{n+1} intervals of length $n + 1$ for every n . In a picture:

$$I_{0,1} I_{1,1} I_{1,2} I_{2,1} \dots I_{2,2^2} I_{3,1} \dots I_{3,2^3} I_{4,1} \dots I_{4,2^4} I_{5,1} \dots$$

where each interval $I_{n,\cdot}$ has length n . Consider the class of all sets \mathcal{A} which guarantees that at least one “1” lies in each of these intervals. An integer-valued martingale can succeed on any set in this class by using the “classic” martingale strategy: in each interval bet \$1 on outcome “1”, then bet \$2 on outcome “1”, then bet \$4 on outcome “1”, etc. until the bet is successful and then stop betting until the next interval. In this way, the gambler nets \$1 income over each interval. After doing this for each of the 2^n intervals of length n , he has enough money to continue this strategy on the next intervals of length $n + 1$. Therefore some integer-valued martingale succeeds on every member of \mathcal{A} .

On the other hand, we now find a $B \in \mathcal{A}$ on which no finitely-valued martingale succeeds. Let M_0, M_1, M_2, \dots be a list of all finitely-valued martingales. Let $B(0) = 1$. For induction assume B has been defined up through I_n , and try to define B on I_{n+1} so that

- for some e , M_e loses some money over I_{n+1} , and
- for every $j < e$, M_j gains no money over I_{n+1} .

If all the intervals B are chosen so as to satisfy these requirements, then all finitely-valued martingales will be obliterated. Indeed each index can only be chosen finitely many times to play the role of e before all the capital of M_e is destroyed, and therefore the choice of e must go to infinity.

While it is impossible to choose values for B so that these requirements are satisfied on every interval, we can satisfy them often enough to defeat every finitely-valued martingale. Assuming that I_{n-1} has been built, we describe how to build I_n . Recall that a finitely-valued martingale always wagers integer dollar amounts. For each finitely-valued martingale M , let $\max(M)$ denote the maximum possible bet for M , and let

$$L(e) = \sum_{j \leq e} [\max(M_j) + 1].$$

Claim: Values for B can be chosen in I_n so that M_e loses money if she makes a nonzero wager before the last $L(e)$ positions of the interval and is the lowest-indexed martingale to do so. Furthermore for all $j < e$, M_j does not gain any money over I_n with these values for B .

Thus if M_0 bets before the last $L(0)$ positions of I_n , B can force M_0 to lose money, thereby satisfying the construction requirements. So we need only consider the case where M_0 bets no money before the last $L(0)$ positions of I_n . By applying the claim above inductively, we may assume that

- each successive M_e bets no money prior to the last $L(e)$ positions of I_n , and
- for each $j \leq e$, M_j earns no profit over I_n .

Eventually B must encounter some martingale M_s which is stupid enough to bet money at the beginning of the interval, at which point the requirements for I_n can be satisfied (assuming I_n is sufficiently long to have such a “beginning.”) If I_n is not longer than $L(s)$ then the requirements are not satisfied on I_n . But we do not worry about this failure because for all e such that $L(e) < |I_n|$, the way of choosing intervals prevents M_e from ever earning money again on any interval I_{n+k} ($k \geq 0$). Thus for every e , there is a sufficiently large N so that for all $n > N$, e gains no money from betting on I_n . So B defeats all finitely-valued martingales.

It remains to prove the claim. We argue by induction. Suppose that M_0 makes a nonzero wager prior to the last $L(0)$ positions of the interval I_n , say at position x_0 . We show how B can force $M(0)$ to lose money over I_n . B can act adversarially throughout the interval except for the constraint inherited from the class \mathcal{A} . It follows that M_0 's betting amounts must be nondecreasing from position x_0 until the end of the interval. If not, then B can spend its obligatory “1” at the position where M_0 decreased her bets. M_0 already has a net loss at this point of decrease, and B can continue to act adversarially until the end. Therefore a decrease in betting amounts after x_0 would cause M_0 to lose. Hence M_0 is forced to bet at least \$1 each of $L(0)$ times. By the final bet in I_n , M_0 is already behind by at least $\max(M_0) + 1$, so this bet is irrelevant; M_0 has already lost.

Since we have already proved the claim when M_0 bets before the last $L(0)$ positions, we can now focus on the case where M_0 bets only during the last $L(0)$ positions. Now it is easy to prevent M_0 from winning any money: B places a “1” anywhere before the $|I_n| - L(0)$ position and then B can act adversarially on the last $L(0)$ positions. Any nonzero wager from M_0 will now instantly result in a loss for M_0 because B is free to everywhere disagree with M_0 . Hence it suffices to consider the case where M_0 does not bet anywhere and B is obligated to post a “1” somewhere before the last $|I_n| - L(0)$ positions.

Curiously, M_1 now finds herself in exactly the same situation that M_0 started with. By same argument as above, B can force M_1 to lose money if M_1 bets prior to $|I_n| - L(1)$. Therefore we can reduce to the case where M_1 never bets and B is obligated to provide a “1” somewhere before $L(2)$. The same argument holds for M_2, M_3, \dots . Eventually some martingale M_e has money and is stupid enough to bet before $L(e)$. At this point, the claim is proved.

Proof of Theorem 16

Let G_0, G_1, \dots be a list of all possible $\{1\}$ -computable “gamblers,” namely a list of pairs consisting of martingales and their respective initial capital. Define a set A such that

- $A(n) = 1$ if $n \equiv 0 \pmod{6}$, and
- $A(n) = 0$ if $n \equiv 3 \pmod{6}$.

The remaining values of A work adversarially against the G_i 's. Since the gamblers must bet exactly \$1 on each value of A , the remaining values of A can be chosen so as to force any particular gambler to decrease his capital by a dollar over the course of any three consecutive rounds of play. We define the first initial segment of A so as to exhaust the capital of G_0 , the following interval of A so as to exhaust the capital of G_1 , etc. Since each gambler has only finite capital at any moment, each gambler's capital is exhausted after a finite period of time. Therefore no $\{1\}$ -valued martingale succeeds on A . Furthermore, by the values assigned at multiples of 3, A contains an infinite recursive set as does its complement.

Proof of Proposition 18

Similar to Theorem 16, we partition the natural numbers into intervals of length 5. For the first two numbers n in each interval (that is, n congruent to 0 or 1 (mod 5)), set $A(n) = 0$ so that gambler can win at these places. The last three spots in each interval are adversarial against the single-valued martingales. A will be able to defeat the $\{1\}$ -valued martingale since the best single-valued martingale strategy would first gain \$2 and then lose \$3 on each interval, for a net loss of \$1 per interval. Eventually the single-valued martingale will run out of money. On the other hand, there exists a $\{1, 2\}$ -valued martingale which always bets \$2 on each of the first two numbers and \$1 on the last three numbers in each interval, for a net gain of at least \$4 - \$3 = \$1 per interval (regardless of any adversarial action that may occur in the last 3 places). Thus the money for this $\{1, 2\}$ -valued martingale on A goes to infinity.

Proof of Theorem 25

We consider the computable generalized Bernoulli measure μ of parameter $(\delta_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ with

$$\delta_n = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n \ln n}}$$

for all $n > 1$ (the values of δ_0 and δ_1 can be set arbitrarily). We have $\sum_{i=2}^n \delta_i^2 \sim \ln \ln n$ (this because $\int (t \ln t)^{-1} dt = \ln \ln t$, in particular $\sum_i \delta_i^2 = +\infty$). By Theorem 24, a sequence X chosen at random according to the measure μ will not be (with probability 1) Kurtz random. We can even exhibit a martingale \mathbf{d} which wins against μ -almost all sequences X . It is defined by $\mathbf{d}(\epsilon) = 1$ and for any string σ of length n :

$$\mathbf{d}(\sigma 0) = (1 - 2\delta_n)\mathbf{d}(\sigma) \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbf{d}(\sigma 1) = (1 + 2\delta_n)\mathbf{d}(\sigma)$$

this martingale is in fact the optimal martingale: when playing against a sequence X that is chosen at random with respect to a measure ν , the optimal martingale is defined by $\mathbf{d}(\sigma) = \nu([\sigma])/\lambda([\sigma])$. It is optimal in the sense that for any other martingale \mathbf{d}' , we have for μ -almost all $X \in \{0, 1\}^\omega$: $\mathbf{d}'(X \upharpoonright n) = O[\mathbf{d}(X \upharpoonright n)]$ (see for example [2]). Here, if we take for ν our generalized Bernoulli measure μ , the optimal martingale is exactly the martingale \mathbf{d} . By Theorem 24, for μ -almost all X , X is not Kurtz random, that is, there exists a real-valued martingale \mathbf{d}' and a recursive order h such that $\mathbf{d}'(X \upharpoonright n) \geq h(n)$. But by optimality, for any real-valued martingale \mathbf{d}' and μ -almost all X , $\mathbf{d}'(X \upharpoonright n) = O[\mathbf{d}(X \upharpoonright n)]$. Putting all this together, this shows that for μ -almost all X , there exists a recursive order h such that $\mathbf{d}(X \upharpoonright n) \geq h(n)$ for all n .

However (and this will be crucial for the rest of the argument), \mathbf{d} succeeds quite slowly on average.

Lemma 27. *Let $r > 0$ be a real number. Then for μ -almost all $X \in \{0, 1\}^\omega$, one has $\mathbf{d}(X \upharpoonright n) = o(n^r)$.*

In order to prove this, we now see X as a random variable with distribution μ . We set for all n :

$$V_n = \mathbf{d}(X \upharpoonright n) \tag{4.2}$$

which is a martingale process. Then set

$$L_n = \ln(V_n) \tag{4.3}$$

By definition of \mathbf{d} we have for all n

$$V_{n+1} = \begin{cases} (1 + 2\delta_n)V_n & \text{with probability } 1/2 + \delta_n \\ (1 - 2\delta_n)V_n & \text{with probability } 1/2 - \delta_n \end{cases} \tag{4.4}$$

thus

$$L_{n+1} = \begin{cases} L_n + \ln(1 + 2\delta_n) & \text{with probability } 1/2 + \delta_n \\ L_n + \ln(1 - 2\delta_n) & \text{with probability } 1/2 - \delta_n \end{cases} \tag{4.5}$$

Setting

$$e_n = \mathbb{E}[L_{n+1} - L_n] = (1/2 + \delta_n) \ln(1 + 2\delta_n) + (1/2 - \delta_n) \ln(1 - 2\delta_n) \quad (4.6)$$

(note *en passant* that $e_n \sim 2\delta_n^2$ by same method as (4.19)) we see that

$$L'_n = L_n - \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} e_i \quad (4.7)$$

is a martingale process. For all n we have $|L'_{n+1} - L'_n| \leq e_n + 2\delta_n$ (here we use the fact that $\ln(1+x) \leq x$ for all $x > -1$). We can thus apply Azuma's Inequality to L'_n : for all integers n and positive real a one has

$$\mu\{L'_n \geq a\} \leq \exp\left(-\frac{a^2}{\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} (e_i + 2\delta_i)^2}\right) \quad (4.8)$$

Taking $a = r \ln n$ (for an arbitrarily small real $r > 0$) in (4.8) we get

$$\mu\{L'_n \geq r \ln n\} \leq \exp\left(-\frac{r^2 (\ln n)^2}{\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} (e_i + 2\delta_i)^2}\right) \quad (4.9)$$

Since $e_i \sim 2\delta_i^2$, we have $e_i = o(\delta_i)$, so

$$\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} (e_i + 2\delta_i)^2 \sim \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} (2\delta_i)^2 \sim 2 \ln \ln n \quad (4.10)$$

Thus for any n large enough:

$$-\frac{r^2 (\ln n)^2}{\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} (e_i + 2\delta_i)^2} \leq -2 \ln n \quad (4.11)$$

Putting (4.9) and (4.11) together, we get

$$\mu\{L'_n \geq r \ln n\} \leq \frac{1}{n^2} \quad (4.12)$$

for almost all n . By the Borel-Cantelli lemma, since $\sum_n 1/n^2$ converges, with μ -probability 1 the event $[L'_n \geq r \ln n]$ happens only finitely often, that is, with probability 1, for any $r > 0$ and almost all n , $L'_n \leq r \ln n$. Since

$$L_n = L'_n + \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} e_i$$

and $\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} e_i \sim 2 \ln \ln n$, it follows similarly that, with μ probability 1, for any $r > 0$ and almost all n , $L_n \leq r \ln n$. And as $L_n = \ln[\mathbf{d}(X \parallel n)]$, all this entails that with μ -probability 1, $\mathbf{d}(X \parallel n) \leq n^r$ for any $r > 0$ and almost all n .

This proves Lemma 27.

Let \mathfrak{D} denote the class of integer-valued martingales. We now consider a restriction of integer-valued martingales: let \mathfrak{D}' be the subset of \mathfrak{D} , consisting of the integer-valued martingales \mathbf{d} that further satisfy $\mathbf{d}(\sigma) < \sqrt{|\sigma|}$ for almost all σ . The following lemma shows that the martingales in \mathfrak{D}' are essentially as powerful as martingales in \mathfrak{D} against sequences X chosen at random according to μ .

Lemma 28. *Let $\mathbf{d} \in \mathfrak{D}$. For μ -almost all X , there exists $\mathbf{d}' \in \mathfrak{D}'$ such that $\mathbf{d}'(X \upharpoonright n) = \mathbf{d}(X \upharpoonright n)$ for almost all n .*

Let $\mathbf{d} \in \mathfrak{D}$. We know from the previous discussion that for μ -almost all X , $\mathbf{d}(X \upharpoonright n) = O(\mathbf{d}(X \upharpoonright n))$ and by Lemma 27, $\mathbf{d}(X \upharpoonright n) = o(\sqrt{n})$. Hence, for μ -almost all X , there exists some n_0 and all $n > n_0$, $\mathbf{d}(X \upharpoonright n) \leq \sqrt{n}/2$. For such a pair (X, n_0) , we call “invalid” all strings σ such that there exists a prefix τ of σ such that $|\tau| \geq n_0$ and either $\mathbf{d}(\tau 0) > \sqrt{|\tau|}$ or $\mathbf{d}(\tau 1) > \sqrt{|\tau|}$, and “valid” any string that is not invalid. Now, define the martingale \mathbf{d}' by $\mathbf{d}'(\sigma) = \mathbf{d}(X \upharpoonright n_0)$ for all σ with $|\sigma| \leq n_0$ and for all σ with $|\sigma| > n_0$, set $\mathbf{d}'(\sigma)$ to be $\mathbf{d}(\tau)$ with τ the longest prefix of σ that is valid. In other words, \mathbf{d}' is the trimmed version of \mathbf{d} that stops betting forever whenever \mathbf{d} makes at stage $n > n_0$ a bet that gives it a chance to get a capital $> \sqrt{n}$. It is easy to see that \mathbf{d}' is itself a martingale, integer-valued as \mathbf{d} is, and since $\mathbf{d}(X \upharpoonright n) \leq \sqrt{n}/2$ for all n , all prefixes of X are valid, hence $\mathbf{d}'(X \upharpoonright n) = \mathbf{d}(X \upharpoonright n)$ for all $n \geq n_0$. This proves the lemma.

Finally, we prove that martingales in \mathfrak{D}' are almost surely defeated by a μ -random X .

Lemma 29. *Let $\mathbf{d} \in \mathfrak{D}'$. For μ -almost all X , \mathbf{d} does not succeed on X .*

Let n_0 be such that $\mathbf{d}(\sigma) \leq \sqrt{|\sigma|}$ for all σ of length $\geq n_0$. Again, we see X as a μ -random variable and define V_n by

$$V_n = \mathbf{d}(X \upharpoonright n) \tag{4.13}$$

(note that by definition of \mathfrak{D}' , we have $V_n \leq \sqrt{n}$ for all $n \geq n_0$) and L_n by

$$L_n = \ln(\mathbf{d}(X \upharpoonright n)) \tag{4.14}$$

with the convention $\ln(0) = -1$. For all n , define also

$$\rho_n = \frac{\mathbf{d}(X \upharpoonright n+1) - \mathbf{d}(X \upharpoonright n)}{\mathbf{d}(X \upharpoonright n)} \tag{4.15}$$

which is the fraction of its capital the martingale \mathbf{d} bets on 1 at stage n . It can be negative if \mathbf{d} bets on 0 and is by convention 1 if $\mathbf{d}(X \upharpoonright n) = 0$. Similarly to (4.5), we have for all n :

$$L_{n+1} = \begin{cases} L_n + \ln(1 + \rho_n) & \text{with probability } 1/2 + \delta_n \\ L_n + \ln(1 - \rho_n) & \text{with probability } 1/2 - \delta_n \end{cases} \tag{4.16}$$

Thus we have:

$$\mathbb{E}[L_{n+1} - L_n] = (1/2 + \delta_n) \ln(1 + \rho_n) + (1/2 - \delta_n) \ln(1 - \rho_n) \quad (4.17)$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} \ln(1 - \rho_n^2) + \delta_n \ln(1 + \rho_n) - \delta_n \ln(1 - \rho_n) \quad (4.18)$$

$$\leq -\frac{\rho_n^2}{2} + 2\delta_n \rho_n \quad (4.19)$$

(for the last inequality, we use again that $\ln(1 + x) \leq x$ for all $x \geq -1$, which is true even for $x = -1$ with our convention $\ln(0) = -1$). Now, observe that ρ_n is either 0, or of the form $\frac{m}{V_n}$ for some integer m as \mathbf{d} is real-valued. In the first case $L_{n+1} = L_n$ and in the second case, since $V_n \leq \sqrt{n}$ for almost all n , we have $|\rho_n| \geq 1/\sqrt{n}$ for almost all n , and therefore $\mathbb{E}[L_{n+1} - L_n] \sim -\frac{\rho_n^2}{2} < 0$ as $\delta_n = o(1/\sqrt{n}) = o(\rho_n)$. This shows that L_n is ultimately a supermartingale, and it is bounded from below by $\ln(0) = -1$. By Doob's Martingale Convergence Theorem L_n converges to a finite value μ -almost surely, hence the same is true for $V_n = \exp(L_n)$. Therefore V_n is μ -almost surely bounded, hence \mathbf{d} is μ -almost surely defeated. This finishes the proof of Lemma 29.

Theorem 25 now easily follows. Take some $X \in \{0, 1\}^\omega$ at random according to μ . By Lemma 29, X defeats all $\mathbf{d} \in \mathfrak{D}'$ μ -almost surely, therefore by Lemma 28, X defeats all $\mathbf{d} \in \mathfrak{D}'$ μ -almost surely. And finally, by definition of μ and Theorem 24, X is μ -almost surely not Kurtz random. Therefore, X is μ -almost surely as wanted, hence the existence of at least one X as wanted.