{"id":21081,"date":"2012-02-28T07:02:49","date_gmt":"2012-02-28T07:02:49","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/?p=21081"},"modified":"2012-03-15T07:26:09","modified_gmt":"2012-03-15T07:26:09","slug":"the-ecological-approach-to-visual-perception","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/?p=21081","title":{"rendered":"The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception"},"content":{"rendered":"<p id=\"top\" \/><em>J. J. Gibson<\/em><\/p>\n<h2>PART 1: The environment to be perceived<\/h2>\n<h3>2. Medium, substances, surfaces<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>As the observer moves from point to point, the optical information, the acoustic information, and the chemical information change accordingly. Each potential point of observation in the medium is unique in this respect. The notion of a medium, therefore, is not the same as the concept of space inasmuch as the points in space are not unique but equivalent to one another. p.17<\/li>\n<li>Hence it is that a medium has an absolute axis of reference, the vertical axis. Even the two horizontal axes of reference are not wholly arbitrary, for they depend on sunrise and sunset. This fact reveals another difference between medium and space, for in space the three reference axes are arbitrary and can be chosen at will. p.18 <em>This is more restricted in the case one manipulates an object, although they have eventually to rest on a stable basis.<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>3. The meaningful environment<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>This capacity to attach something to the body suggests that the boundary between the animal and the environment is not fixed at the surface of the skin but can shift. More generally it suggests that the absolute duality of &#8220;objective&#8221; and &#8220;subjective&#8221; is false. When we consider the affordances of things, we escape this philosophical dichotomy. p.41 <em>Objectiveness belongs to physiscs. When we describe an object in terms of its shape features, we identify the accumulation of observations we would get by looking at the object from different points of view.<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>PART 2: The information for Visual Perception<\/h2>\n<h3>4. The relationship between stimulation and stimulus information<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Illumination is a fact of higher order than radiation. In physical optics, experimenters try to avoid what they call stray light in the dark room. But in ecological optics, this light that has gone astray is just what interests us. The opticist works with rays of light, rays that diverge in all directions from their source and never converge to a point unless they are focused by a lens. But an organism has to work with light that converges from all directions and, moreover, has different intensities in different directions. p.50 <em>Such a high-level model of illumination will likely emerge from the study of low-level radiant light though.<\/em><\/li>\n<li>It is possible to conceive a nested set of solid angles at each point in the medium, as distinguished from a dense set of intersecting lines. The set of solid angles would be the same whatever the intensity of illumination might be. They are angles of intercept, based on the environment. p.51 <em>This sounds like the decomposition of an envmap! However, Gibson is not talking about a point on a surface, but about a point in the medium here&#8230;<\/em><\/li>\n<li>Note also that a stimulus, strictly speaking, is temporary. There is nothing lasting about it, as there is about a persisting object of the environment. A stimulus must begin and end. If it persists, the response of the receptor tapers off and ceases; the term for this is sensory adaptation. Hence, a permanent object cannot possibly be specified by a stimulus. p.56 <em>The spatial and temporal rates of change of the stimulus are the real entries to perception, the raw data the HVS has to make sense of by actively probing the environment for a comprehensive interpretation.<\/em><\/li>\n<li>For we cannot explain perception in terms of communication; it is quite the other way around. We cannot convey information about the world to others unless we have perceived the world. And the available information for our perception is radically different from the information we convey. p.63 <em>Sounds like a praise for expressive rendering!<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>5. The ambient optic array<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>It is important to realize that the flowing perspective structure and the underlying invariant structure are concurrent. They exist at the same time. Although they speciify different things, locomotion through a rigid world in the first instance and the layout of that rigid world in the second instance, they are like the two sides of a coin, for each implies the other. p.76 <em>What is implied is that locomotion is a mean bu which layout invariants are discovered. But what about texture and reflectance invariants?<\/em><\/li>\n<li>Kinetic disruption. There is a disturbance of the structure of the array that is not a transformation, not even a transformation that passes through its vanishing limit, but a breaking of its adjacent order. More exactly, there is either a progressive decrementing of components of structure, called deletion, or its opposite, a progressive incrementing of components of structure, called accretion. An edge that is covering the background deletes from the array; an edge that is uncovering the background accretes to it. There is no such disruption for the surface that is covering or uncovering, only for the surface that is being covered or uncovered. And nondisruption, I suggest, is a kind of invariance. p.83 <em>Maybe this is because occluded ans dis-occluded motions cannot be explained in terms of simple temporal transformations?<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>6. Events and information for perceiving events<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>We should begin thinking of events as the primary realities and of time as an abstraction from them-a concept derived mainly from regular repeating events, such as the ticking of clocks. Events are perceived, but time is not. p.100<\/li>\n<li>What specifies the event? In general terms, the answer must be that there is a disturbance in the invariant structure of the array. Presumably there are different kinds of disturbances for different kinds of events. p.102 <em>Temporal artifacts are then those events in the array that cannot be related to any event in the environment.<\/em><\/li>\n<li>What I am saying is that even a motion in the sky is a change in the sky-form, that even a displacement\u00a0 within the frame of a window is a change of structure and not simply a motion. p.103 <em>No subset of the array is ever isolated from its surround.<\/em><\/li>\n<li>It would seem that the uneven flow of the surface of water in a river-the bubbles and flecks of the surface-has a corresponding flow of the optical texture in the array. But this does not hold for the ripples or waves over the surface, because the ripples do not move in the same way the textured surface does. The fluctuation of light and shade does not correspond to the surface. And, of course, if the crests of the waves are high they will begin to hide the troughs, and the occluding edges will spoil the projective correspondence. p.104 <em>Depending on the point of view, the same 3d event (e.g., the deformation of a water surface) might result in very different 2d events (e.g., glistening of light at a distance, highlights deformed by waves from a close view, and<\/em> <em>occlusions depending on the base plane slant and wave height).<\/em><\/li>\n<li>The loss by substitution should specifY a surface that goes out of existence. The loss by deletion should specify a surface that goes out of sight at an occluding edge. p.107 <em>Stated another way, when motion transparency evolves, we are in the case of destruction\/creation of a surface.<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>7. The optical information for self-perception<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>For each of the three kinds of optical gradient that I proposed as &#8220;stimuli&#8221; for seeing depth in The Perception of the Visual World-size perspective, disparity perspective, and motion perspective-the nose provides an absolute base line, the absolute zero of distance-from-here. p.117<\/li>\n<li>What is not so familiar is the fact that these turns of the head are also registered by vision. They are specified by what I have called the sweeping of the field of view over the ambient array during head turns and the wheeling of the field over the array during head tilts. The sweeping and wheeling of this window with its special private occluding edges are not simply &#8220;motions&#8221; but deletions and accretions of optical structure. p.118 <em>Ego-motion cues are thus provided at image borders!<\/em><\/li>\n<li>When the decreasing occlusion of the surface by the extremity ceases, and when there is no accretion or deletion of surface texture by the occluding edges of the hand or foot, then the extremity is in contact with the surface and not sliding over it. This specifies, for example, that the foot is on the ground. p.121 <em>It seems that it should work for any contact! When using a tool we are temporarily attached to it so that normal occlusions between our body and the tool tend to vanish.<\/em><\/li>\n<li>How do we see where we are going? We guide or steer our locomotion, when we are in control of it, by locating those invariant features of the array that specify a destination, whatever it may be, and then keeping the focus of optical outflow centered on that item. In short, we magnify the form that specifies the goal. p.122<\/li>\n<li>To say that one perceives an outflow of the world ahead and an inflow of the world behind as one moves forward in the environment would be quite false. One experiences a rigid world and a flowing array. The optical flow of the ambient array is almost never perceived as motion; it is simply experienced as kinesthesis, that is egolocomotion. p.123<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>8. The theory of affordances<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Nevertheless, a unique combination of invariants, a compound invariant, is just another invariant. It is a unit, and the components do not have to be combined or associated. Only if percepts were combinations of sensations would they have to be associated. p.141 <em>If affordances can be conceived as invariant combinations of invariants, then they share a lot in common with Minsky&#8217;s frames.<\/em><\/li>\n<li>The virtue of the psychophysical experiment is simply that it is disciplined, not that it relates the psychical to the physical by a metric formula. p.141 <em>The experiment should explain something!<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>PART 3: Visual Perception<\/h2>\n<h3>9. Experimental evidence for direct perception: persisting layout<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>It is true that the optical texture of the grass becomes denser and more vertically compressed as the ground recedes from the observer, but the rule of equal amounts of texture for equal amounts of terrain remains invariant. p.162<\/li>\n<li>If I want my eye level, the horizon, to rise above all the clutter of the environment, I must climb up to a high place. The perception of here and the perception of infinitely distant from here are inked. p.164 <em>This is a strong constraint on layout!<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>10. Experiments on the perception of motion in the world and movement of the self<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The stimulus information for motion is the change of pattern, and the information is the same for an intermittent change as for a continuous change. The stroboscope demonstrates only that the motion of an object in the world from one place to another does not have to be copied by a corresponding motion of an image on the retina from one point to another in order for the event to be perceived. p.171 <em>Thus one could convey motion by displaying the minimum amount of frames necessary to convey important changes.<\/em><\/li>\n<li>Thus, the available information in an optic array for continuity could be described as the preservation of adjacent order, which is to say, the absence of its permutation. A size transformation and the rigid transformation of foreshortening, as well as the nonrigid transformation of stretching, leave order invariant. p.181 <em>This is related to motion transparency and it seems that any variation of adjacency would produce it. But what about very noisy patterns? Why do we see 2 instead of N patterns?<\/em><\/li>\n<li>To speak of the environment being rotated relative to the observer in these cases (instead of the body being rotated relative to the environment) would be simply nonsense. The environment, in the sense of the persisting environment, is that with reference to which objects move, animals move, and surfaces deform. There has to be an underlying nonchange if change is to be specified. The principle of the relativity of motion cannot be applied to rotation of the body. p.187 <em>It becomes obvious once one pictures a rotation as a frame sweeping across an otherwise static spherical optic array<\/em>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>11. The discovery of the occluding edge and its implications for perception<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The surface that was being covered was seen to persist after being concealed, and the surface that was being uncovered was seen to pre-exist before being revealed. The hidden surface could not be described as remembered in one case or expected in the other. A better description would be that it was perceived retrospectively and prospectively. It is certainly reasonable to describe perception as extending into the past and the future, but note that to do so violates the accepted doctrine that perception is confined to the present. p.190 <em>This is consistent with Dennett&#8217;s theory of consciousness.<\/em><\/li>\n<li>There is a vast difference between the persistence of a percept and the perception of persistence. p.191 <em>Here seems to lie the closest connection between perception and cognition.<\/em><\/li>\n<li>The fact is that, although one can become aware of the seen-now and the seen-from-here if one takes the attitude of introspection, what one perceives is an environment that surrounds one, that is everywhere equally clear, that is in-the-round or solid, and that is all-of-a-piece. p.195<\/li>\n<li>It is obvious that a motionless observer can see the world from a single fixed point of observation and can thus notice the perspectives of things. It is not so obvious but it is true that an observer who is moving about sees the world at no point of observation and thus, strictly speaking, cannot notice the perspectives of things. The implications are radical. Seeing the world at a traveling point of observation, over a long enough time for a sufficiently extended set of paths, begins to be perceiving the world at all points of observation, as if one could be everywhere at once. To be everywhere at once , with nothing hidden is to be all-seeing, like God. Each object is seen from all sides, and each place is seen as connected to its neighbor. The world is not viewed in perspective. The underlying invariant structure has emerged from the changing perspective structure. p.197 <em>There might thus be an intricate link between (at least instant) memory and perception.<\/em><\/li>\n<li>A map is a useful artifact when the hiker is lost, but it is a mistake to confuse the artifact with the psychological state the artifact promotes. p.199 <em>A better understanding of human orientation is thus a key to the &#8220;reverse-engineering&#8221; of efficient maps.<\/em><\/li>\n<li>If a set of observers move around, the same invariants under optical transformations and occlusions will be available to all. To the extent that the invariants are detected, all observers will perceive the same world. Each will also be aware that his or her place in the world is different here and now from that of any other. p.200 <em>Reflections cannot thus possibly part of invariants, although they may reveal others such as surface shape and material properties.<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>12. Looking with the head and eyes<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Egoreception and exteroception are inseparable kinds of experience. The seeing of oneself is not a complex intellectual experience but a simple primitive one. The orthodox dogma that no animal but the human animal has self-consciousness is surely false. p.205<\/li>\n<li>But the truth is that attention is not only selective, it is also integrative. Attention can be distributed as well as being concentrated. The awareness of details is not inconsistent with the awareness of wholes. Each in fact implies the other. One can perfectly well pay attention to some aspect of the environment that extends over a large angle of the ambient array, such as the gradient of the ground that goes all the way from one&#8217;s feet out to the horizon. Hence, a whole series of fixations can be a single act of attention. p.213 <em>We thus need an analysis that takes the full FOV into account, as for instance a large set of basis functions.<\/em><\/li>\n<li>It supposes that two eyes have no more difficulty in perceiving one object than two hands do in feeling one object, or than two ears do in perceiving one event. The dual ocular system registers both the matching of structure between the optic and the mismatch of their structure, both the congruence and the disparity, at the same time. The two eyes are not two channels of sensation but a single system. p.213 <em>It means that the same measurements (tensors?) due to motion could be used, replacing locomotion by the transform from one eye to ther other! Note that since such motion is reversible, the signed direction scarcely matters.<\/em><\/li>\n<li>The human binocular system extracts the similarities of structure between two arrays, I suggest, just as each eye extracts the invariants of structure in its own array. Varying convergence of the binocular system is a kind of exploration, like the varying fixation of each monocular system. The dual array is available for exploration just as the single array is. The difference in perspective structure between two arrays is the same as the change in perspective structure of one array when one eye moves sideways through the interocular distance. p.214<\/li>\n<li>The body explores the surrounding environment by locomotion; the head explores the ambient array by turning; and the eyes explore the two samples of the array, the fields of view, by eye movements. These might be called exploratory adjustments. At the lower levels, eyelid, lens, pupil, and retinal cells make what might be called optimizing adjustments. Both the global structure and the fine structure of an array constitute information. The observer needs to look around, to look at, to focus sharply, and to neglect the amount of light. Perception needs to be both comprehensive and clear. The visual system hunts for comprehension and clarity. It does not rest until the invariants are extracted. Exploring and optimizing seem to be the functions of the system. p.219<\/li>\n<li>The flow of optical stimulation is not a sequence of stimuli or a series of discrete snapshots. If it were, the sequence would have to be converted into a scene. The flow is sampled by the visual system. And the persistence of the environment together with the coexistence of its parts and the concurrence of its events are all perceived together. p.222<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>13. Locomotion and manipulation<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Locomotion and manipulation are neither triggered nor commanded but controlled. They are constrained, guided, or steered, and only in this sense are they ruled or governed. And they are controlled not by the brain but by information, that is, by seeing oneself in the world. Control lies in the animal-environment system. Control is by the animal in its world, the animal itself having subsystems for perceiving the environment and concurrently for getting about in it and manipulating it. The rules lat govern behavior are not like laws enforced by an authority or decisions made by commander; behavior is regular without being regulated. p.225<\/li>\n<li>WHAT SPECIFIES LOCOMOTION OR STASIS? 1) Flow of the ambient array specifies locomotion, and nonfiow specifies stasis. 2) Outflow specifies approach to and inflow specifies retreat from. 3) The focus or center of outflow specifies the direction of locomotion in the environment. 4) A shift of the center of outflow from one visual solid angle to another specifies a change in the direction of locomotion, a turn, and a remaining of the center within !he same solid angle specifies no change in direction. 5) Flow of the textured ambient array just behind certain occluding protrusions into the field of view specifies locomotion by an animal with feet. p.227-228<\/li>\n<li>WHAT SPECIFIES AN OBSTACLE OR AN OPENING? 6) Loss (or gain) of structure outside a closed contour dllring approach (or retreat) specifies an obstacle. Gain (or loss) of structure inside a closed contour during approach (or retreat) specifies an opening. 7) Gain of structure above a horizontal contour in the ambient array during approach specifies a brink in the surface of support. 8) Gain of structure on one side of a vertical contour in the ambient array during approach specifies the occluding edge of a barrier, and the side on which gain occurs is the side of the edge that affords passage. p.229-230 <em>All these elements depend on locomotion direction!<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>14. The theory of information pickup and its consequences<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>In the case of the persisting thing, I suggest, the perceptual system simply extracts the invariants from the flowing array; it resonates to the invariant structure or is attuned to it. In the case of substantially distinct things, I venture, the perceptual system must abstract the invariants. The former process seems to be simpler than the latter, more nearly automatic. The latter process has been interpreted to imply an intellectual act, lifting out something that is mental from a collection of objects that are physical, of ,rming an abstract concept from concrete percepts, but that is very dubious. Abstraction is invariance detection across objects. But the invariant is only a similarity, not a persistence. p.249<\/li>\n<li>According to the theory being proposed, perceiving is a registering of certain definite dimensions of invariance in the stimulus flux together with definite parameters of disturbance. The invariants are invariants of structure, and the disturbances are disturbances of structure. The structure, for vision, is that of the ambient optic array. p.249<\/li>\n<li>A perceptual system that has become sensitized to certain invariants and can extract them from the stimulus flux can also operate without the constraints of the stimulus flux. Information becomes further detached from stimulation. The adjustment loops for looking around, looking at, scanning, and focusing are then inoperative. The visual system visualizes. But this is still an activity of the system, not an appearance in the theater of consciousness. p.256<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>PART 4: Depiction<\/h2>\n<h3>15. Pictures and visual awareness<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>It assumes that some of the invariants of an array can be separated from its perspective structure, not only when the perspective keeps changing, as in life, but also when it is arrested, as in a still picture. This says that formless invariants can be detected in a picture that seems to consist entirely of forms. Ordinarily, these invariants underlie the transformations and emerge most clearly when the persisting properties separate off from the changing properties, but they can also be distinguished in the limiting case of an unchanging structure. p.271 <em>Is there some kind of &#8220;simulation&#8221; going on? That would this time infer formless invariants from potential motion? Isn&#8217;t it the same thing we do when we look in the distance? Indeed, there&#8217;s no visible change in most cases and we need to &#8220;guess&#8221;.<\/em><\/li>\n<li>Even a photograph records a field of view, a sample of the ambient light, and is thus analogous to looking with the head. It is a record of what the photographer selected for attention. A chirograph is even more selective. Any picture, then, preserves what its creator has noticed and considers worth noticing. Even when she paints a fiction or a fantasy, she does it with invariants that have been noticed in the course of learning to perceive. p.274 <em>A picture thus lacks some information that would be provided by a changing point of view, but it provides more time to scrutinize the &#8220;imagined invariants&#8221;.<\/em><\/li>\n<li>The traces he leaves on the paper are not just lines, but the distinguishing features of the environment. While drawing, he may be looking at something real, or thinking about something real, or thinking about something wholly imaginary; in any case, the invariants of his visual system are resonating. p.278 <em>Which is why the study of pictorial art helps reveal invariants of visual perception.<\/em><\/li>\n<li>If a picture displays the perspective of a scene it puts the viewer into the scene, but that is all. It does not enhance the reality of the scene. The seeing of oneself is not negligible, but it is not the sole aim of depiction. p.283<\/li>\n<li>What modern painters are trying to do, if they only knew it, is paint invariants. What should interest them is not abstractions, not concepts, not space, not motion, but invariants. p.284<\/li>\n<li>One can depict without a fixed point of observation, just as one can visualize without a point of observation, although it is not easy to understand how. But depiction with a point of observation is the more natural sort, and the photographic picture is necessarily of this sort. p.284<\/li>\n<li>The information in a line drawing is evidently carried by the connections of the lines, not by lines as such. To put it another way, the invariants are found in the ways that the areas are nested, not in the forms of these areas. These ways are difficult to describe in words. The connections, junctions, and intersections of lines remain invariant under a changing perspective of the surfaces. p.288<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>16. Motion pictures and visual awareness<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Painters cannot display or represent motion, but they can certainly specify an event. The stopped event may contain the information for perceiving it. The wind in the trees can be depicted if the painter selects the right form in the transformation. So can the smile of a sitter for a portrait. The act of dancing can be conveyed by a photographer because the invariants are different from those of standing or walking. There are event-invariants as well as formless object-invariants. p.294 <em>Painting motion may thus be like picking up event invariants and selectively reproducing them.<\/em><\/li>\n<li>The film maker cannot interfere with your eye movements. It can control only your head movements and your locomotion. p.295<\/li>\n<li>A cut represents a displacement of the camera between shots. The most intelligible cuts, I suggest, are those between shots that have some invariant structure in common. Displacement of the camera forward or backward yields a structure that is magnified or minified, and one sees the same layout afterward as berore. Such a displacement is the same as a doIly shot or a zoom, except that it is discontinuous. p.299 <em>In a way, this is like animation: if sufficient coherence (invariants) from one frame to the other is found, the eye can grab the transition, and thus motion.<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>Conclusion<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li>Perceivers are not aware of the dimensions of physics. They are aware of the dimensions of the information in the flowing array of stimulation that are relevant to their lives. p.306 <em>Okay, let&#8217;s study these flows!<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>J. J. Gibson PART 1: The environment to be perceived 2. Medium, substances, surfaces As the observer moves from point to point, the optical information, the acoustic information, and the chemical information change accordingly. Each potential point of observation in the medium is unique in this respect. The notion of a medium, therefore, is not &#8230; <a title=\"The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception\" class=\"read-more\" href=\"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/?p=21081\" aria-label=\"Read more about The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception\">Read more<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[621],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-21081","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-books"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21081","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=21081"}],"version-history":[{"count":17,"href":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21081\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":21101,"href":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21081\/revisions\/21101"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=21081"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=21081"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=21081"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}