{"id":5081,"date":"2010-07-26T15:35:33","date_gmt":"2010-07-26T15:35:33","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/?p=5081"},"modified":"2012-07-09T16:04:10","modified_gmt":"2012-07-09T16:04:10","slug":"brainstorms","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/?p=5081","title":{"rendered":"Brainstorms"},"content":{"rendered":"<p id=\"top\" \/><em>Daniel Dennett<\/em><\/p>\n<h2>Part I. Intentional explanation and attributions of mentality<\/h2>\n<h3>Intentional systems<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>One can switch stances at will without involving oneself in any inconsistencies or inhumanities, adopting the intentional stance in one&#8217;s role as opponent, the design stance in one&#8217;s role as redesigner, and the physical stance in one&#8217;s role as repairman. p.7<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>Reply to Arbib and Gunderson<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The logic of the concept of recognition dictates an open-ended and shifting class of appropriate further tasks, abilities, reactions and distinctions that ideally would manifest themselves in any face-recognizer under various conditions. p.24 <em>This is the way innovations should be evaluated in CGs and CV: the deviation from an ideal system, which may itself evolve with new scientific understanding of a problem and expectations regarding its solutions. Different reviewers may have different ideals, and a convincing innovation is the one that will rarely fail regarding their expectations from an intentional stance.<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>Brain writing and mind reading<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The effort of retrieval is often an effort to formulate a sentence that is an approximation of a belief, and we are often distressed by the hard edge of determinacy our verbal output substitutes for the fuzziness of our convictions. &#8211; p.48 <em>And by further corrections, as if we were drawing pieces of a puzzle on a board that do not quite match, we &#8220;think in words&#8221;&#8230; This is an example of conscious, concentrated expression (turned toward the inside), that is to contrast with more common episodes where we utter previsible ideas or mere gibberish.<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>Part II. The nature of theory in Psychology<\/h2>\n<h3>Why the law of effect will not go away<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>It takes two to invent anything. The one makes up combinations; the other one chooses, recognizes what he wishes and what is important to him in the mass of the things which the former has imparted to him. &#8211; p.71<\/li>\n<li>The original solution to a problem must lie in the category of luck. There appears to be a trade-off here between, roughly, spontaneity or fertility of imagination on the one hand, and a critical eye on the other. A task of invention seems to require both, and it looks like a straightforwardly empirical question subject to continuous variation how much of each gets done by each collaborator. &#8211; p.87<\/li>\n<li>If we are to have any adequate analysis of creativity, invention, intelligence, it must be one in which intelligence is analysed into something none of whose parts is intelligence, and at that level of analysis, of course, no &#8220;self&#8221; worth identifying with can survive. &#8211; p.89<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>A cure for the common code?<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>As Michael Arbib has suggested, what the frog&#8217;s eye tells the frog&#8217;s brain is not what the frog&#8217;s eye tells the frog. &#8211; p.101<\/li>\n<li>Put otherwise, cognitivist theories are or should be theories of the subpersonal level, where beliefs and desires disappear, to be replaced with representations of other sorts on other topics. &#8211; p.105 <em>But then, we need to understand how intentional theories rest on the basis of cognitive systems, which themselves rest on the basis of perceptual systems (roughly)<\/em>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>Artificial Intelligence as Philosophy and Psychology<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li> The task of psychology is to explain human perception, learning, cognition, and so forth in terms that will ultimately unite psychological theory to physiology in one way or another, and there are two broad strategies one could adopt: a bottom-up strategy that starts with some basic and well-defined unit or theoretical atom for psychology, and builds these atoms into molecules and larger aggregates that can account for the complex phenomena we all observe, or a top-down strategy that begins with a more abstract decomposition of the highest levels of psychological organization, and hopes to analyze these into more and more detailed smaller systems or processes until finally one arrives at elements familiar to the biologists. &#8211; p.110 <em>What about a &#8220;dig inbetween&#8221; approach that takes some rough model of bottom\/up activity as granted and outputs a reasonnably useful, higher-level representation? We should find ways to test the success of such an enterprise, which may be expected to provide corrections up-stream (perception) and down-stream (cognition).<br \/>\n<\/em><\/li>\n<li>In AI or cognitive psychology the typical attempt to answer a general top-down question consists in designing a particular system that does, or appears to do, the relevant job, and then considering which of its features are necessary not just to one particular system but to any such system. AI can be (and should often be taken to be) as abstract and &#8220;unempirical&#8221; as philosophy in the questions it attempts to answer, but at the same time, it should be as explicit and particularistic in its models as psychology at its best. &#8211; p.112-113<\/li>\n<li>The psychological reality of an AI program is thus usually intended to be only skin deep; only the highest levels of program description and commentary are to be counted as the model. &#8211; p.115 <em>Dig-inbetween models have similar outer-skin, as they model potential\/capacity of a system to represent finer-grained data. But their product is also a mid-level interpretation, that may be called a &#8220;feature&#8221;, so it is more like the envelope that represents an organ.<\/em><\/li>\n<li>The more raw and uninterpreted the representation &#8211; e.g., the mosaic of retinal stimulation at an instant &#8211; the more sophisticated the interpreter or user of the representation. The more interpreted a representation &#8211; the more procedural information is embodied in it, for instance &#8211; the less fancy the interpreter need be. &#8211; p.124 <em>Higher-level interpretations are thus placed in another pool with fewer entities that interact always at a simple level. Only from an &#8220;external&#8221; point of view will it appear more complex. <\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>Part III. Objects of Consciousness and the nature of experience<\/h2>\n<h3>Are dreams experiences?<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>A plausible theory of experience will be one that does justice to three distinguishable families of intuitions we have about experience and consciousness: those dealing with the role of experience in guiding current behavior, those dealing with our current proclivities and capacities to say what we are experiencing, and those dealing with the retrospective or recollective capacity to say. &#8211; p.147-148<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>Toward a cognitive theory of Consciousness<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>What convinces me that a cognitivistic theory could capture all the dear features I discover in my inner life is not any &#8220;argument&#8221;, and not just the programmatic appeal of thereby preserving something like &#8220;the unity of science&#8221;, but rather a detailed attempt to describe to myself exactly those features of my life and the nature of my acquaintance with them that I would cite as my &#8220;grounds for claiming that I am &#8211; and do not merely seem to be &#8211; conscious. &#8211; p.173 <em>Isn&#8217;t it the same about emotions? Like suffering: how can we tell someone is experiencing it? Is there any reason to think a nation could surfer as well? In a similar way? This is where a deeper understanding becomes necessary.<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>Two approaches to Mental Images<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>By defining mental images as the intentional objects of beta-manifolds, the second approach guarantees the existence of mental images as logical constructs. On this approach, mental images are at least as real as Santa Claus. Just as one might set out to learn all there is to be learned about Santa Claus, the intentional object, so one might set out to learn all there is to be learned about those intentional objects, people&#8217;s mental images. &#8211; p.181<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>Why you can&#8217;t make a computer that feels pain<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The content-sensitivity of some forms of analgesia and the time-dependence of morphine&#8217;s analgesic effect can only be explained by a theory that treats the experience of pain as somehow the outcome of a process of perceptual analysis. This invocation of perceptual analysis restores the new high path in the cortex to a position of importance in our account, and suggests that activity in the old low path is important not because it is or amounts to pain, but because it is a major contributing condition of pain. &#8211; p.215 <em>This seems to be related to attention processes and the separation between the old limbic system and the new neocortex system recalls the separation between perception and cognition.<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>Part IV. Free will and personhood<\/h2>\n<h3>Mechanism and responsibility<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Communication, then, is not a separable and higher stance one may choose to adopt toward something, but a type of interaction one may attempt within the intentional stance. The ethical implication to be extracted from the distinction of stance is not that the intentional stance is a moral stance, but that it is a precondition of any moral stance, and hence if it is jeopardized by any triumph of mechanism, the notion of moral responsibility is jeopardized in turn. &#8211; p.242-243 <em>Could we think of a weak form of intentional stance where we only observe and try to predict behaviors in a mechanistic way without hypothesizing beliefs and desires? <\/em><\/li>\n<li>The crucial point when assessing responsibility is whether or not the antecendent inputs achieve their effects as inputs of information, or by short-circuit. &#8211; p.248<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>The abilities of men and machines<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>In one sense an animal &#8211; in fact any fairly complicated object, can be a number of different Turing machines at once, depending on our choice of input, state descriptions, and so forth. No one of these can be singled out on purely structural or mechanical grounds as the Turing machine interpretation of the animal. If we want to give sense to that task, we must raise considerations of purpose and design, and then no objectively confirmable answer will be forthcoming, for if Smith and Jones disagree about the ultimate purpose of particular structures or activities of the animal, there is no Designer to interview, no blueprint to consult. &#8211; p.261 <em>There is a parallel with different theories for different scales.<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>Conditions of personhood<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The theme suggests that a person must be able to reciprocate the stance, which suggests that an intentional system that itself adopted the intentional stance toward other objects would meet the test. &#8211; p.273 <em>This sounds similar to low-level consciousness.<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>On giving Libertarians what they say they want<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The model of decision making I am proposing has the following feature: when we are faced with an important decision, a consideration-generator whose output is to some degree undetermined produces a series of considerations, some of which may of course be immediately rejected as irrelevant by the agent (consciously or unconsciously). Those considerations that are selected by the agent as having a more than negligible bearing on the decision then figure in a reasoning process, and if the agent is in the main reasonable, those considerations ultimately serve as predictors and explicators of the agent&#8217;s final decision. &#8211; p.295<\/li>\n<li>If it is a good random number generator the sequence will be locally and globally patternless. There will be a complete absence of regularities on which to base predictions about unexamined portions of the sequence. &#8211; p.298 <em>This conception of undeterminacy shows how much the dividing line between determinism and indeterminism is fuzzy and human-centric. The level of determinacy may well depend on our introspective abilities regarding decision-making as well as how much attention we devote to a choice when it&#8217;s made under more or less pressure (what about reflexes?)<\/em>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>How to change your mind<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Now why do we have opinions at all? And why do we have them while animals don&#8217;t? Because we have language. I think the way to look at it is this: once you have a language, there are all these sentences lying around, and you have to do something with them. You have to put them in boxes labeled &#8220;True&#8221; and &#8220;False&#8221; for one thing. It is my beliefs and desires that predict my behavior directly. My opinions can be relied on to predict my behavior only to the degree, normally large, that my opinions and beliefs are in rational correspondence. &#8211; p.306-307<\/li>\n<li>There are in any case many ways of adding to one&#8217;s collection of opinions, just as there are many ways of acquiring paintings or overcoats. * One can inherit them, fall into possession of them without noticing, fail to discard them after deciding to discard them, take them on temporary loan and forget that this is what one has done. &#8211; p.307 <em>Culture would then only have a direct grip on opinions, not on beliefs. That might explain interpersonal similarities within a same culture and the power of language in this regard.<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Daniel Dennett Part I. Intentional explanation and attributions of mentality Intentional systems One can switch stances at will without involving oneself in any inconsistencies or inhumanities, adopting the intentional stance in one&#8217;s role as opponent, the design stance in one&#8217;s role as redesigner, and the physical stance in one&#8217;s role as repairman. p.7 Reply to &#8230; <a title=\"Brainstorms\" class=\"read-more\" href=\"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/?p=5081\" aria-label=\"Read more about Brainstorms\">Read more<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[621],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5081","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-books"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5081","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=5081"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5081\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":22761,"href":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5081\/revisions\/22761"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=5081"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=5081"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.labri.fr\/perso\/barla\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=5081"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}